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Wc show lhal LjW18's projecriun aig()riliJrru, which huv.:: rtecntly been used by 
cconomiru 10 establish convergence lu rationl11 expectations equilibrium.. do not 
seem tu apply tu learning or forecasting beha\'ior that one would normally call 
-decentralized." rr the algorithm is defined in a W3)' thllt anOWJ individusls to have 
differing information. theD Ljung'$ theorem does nol Ilppty. And c'""Cn ir:l ~imililr 
theorem could be proved that would 0.110"" ro. dlITcring information, there remaIns 
:I LYllpunO\,·likc. conditiuD thal is central la Ljung's projection method and which 
requires that individunl beliefs be mUTowly n=lned to the equilibrium nod to onc 
another. JmdnaJ of Economic Lil(ratuu OlUillicarlon Numbers: 083, D&4, e72, 
082. (I I~ A~ic Preu. hu;: 
In .everal recent srudies of .he way individual economic units might 
learn their parts of a ralional expectations equilibrium, tbe learning process 
bas been modeled I\!i " recursive algorithm in which individuals' expecta-
tion. depend upon tbeir observations of v"riables that arc influenced by 
others' expectations. The critical tool for establishing tbat .he learning pro· 
cess converges to an equilibrium has been a theorem of Ljung [I] that 
gives sumcient conditions for convergence of a general class of recursive 
stocbaslic estimation algoritllms. (See, in particular. Marcet and Sargen. 
[3,4] and Woodford [6]. ) It seems reasonable to hope tha. tbe same 
approach will also help us to understand lhe process by which tbe players 
in a noncooperative game might learn their parts of a Nash equilibrium. a 
particular kind of rational expectations eqUilibrium. 
In tbe analysis of a noncooperative game, one's attention is n.turally 
drawn to the question whether the learning process has been modeled as, 
a "decentralized" process, in tbe sense that .he players are aUowcd to have 
independent information and that they arc allowed to act independently 
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even if they have the same inrormation. \Vc show that the learning 
behavior described by Ljung', class of algorithms does not bave this decen-
tralized character. Thus, Ljung's approach may not be so attractive for the 
analysis of learning behavior in gamcs- or indeed for lhe analysis of any 
kind of dCL't'ntrali:ed learning process. 
LjunS's method consisL, essentially of two theorems, Theorems 1 and 4 
in [1], which wc refer to as l.jung·, First and Second Theorems. rc-spec-
rively. Ljuug's First Theorem require., onc to establish that the sequenc'C 
of forecasts generated by th(.' learning algorithm contains a bounded 
subsequence. Because this boundedncss property is g,encr:.JlJy dilftcuh to 
verify. Ljung nexl introduces" "projection operator" according to which, 
wbenever (he algorithm yields an ··obviously bad" forecasl [he forecast is 
replaced wit h "something mon: rC.,Jsonuhle: ' Ljung's Second Theorem 
then gives a coudition that (:-0 usually easier to verify than boundcdw 
ncss--a kind ur Lyapunov condition--which guardntees that the sequence 
of forecasts generated by tbe- pr(~jf!L'li01r algorithm (hut not necessarily 
those generated by the original :dgorithm ) will converge lO the c.orrect 
forecast. 
The macroeconomic npplie'lIiom of Lj ung's method that appear in [3,4. 
6] arc all applications or [he Second Theorem. inv olving the projection 
operator. The idea in thcs.c applications 5ceOl!oO to be that everyone is sl:t:in g 
the same data - perh aps even [hat a small collection of "'pert forecasters 
are gencraling (he forecasts to be used by the partiCipanL') in thc 
economy-and that therefo re the rorecasL< should move together. Further-
more, it is then rensonahle that the forecasters will all invoke the projection 
operator lOgether. But when ind ividuals have diflerelll information . they 
will not generally arrive a t "obviously bad" foreca,t, together, and they will 
therefore nol invoke the projection operator lOgcther-~md. therefore, as 
we 'how, Ljung', Second Theorem does not apply. 
Let us try to apply Ljung\ Sccoml Theorem (10 be dc-<;cribed shortly) 
to a simple model in which, at each period / ~ 1, 2. .... ench person j 
ob""",,, the value of a real variable : , (1) and then. based upon his obser-
vatio ns =/( I) . .... z/(t). he makes H forccast x/(11 of what his next observa-
tion Z/ (I + I) will be. In p<.Irticular. wc assume that Ihere arC only two 
pcr~o I1 S mal that t.heir obscn'3rions and fnrccasts arc: dClCnnined by Ihr.: 
equati ons 
and 
:( I) = Bxll - 11 + e{ 1 J. 
1 
.\(1) = .,(/- j ) -1- - (:(1)- ., (/ - j I), 
/ 
(I) 
(2 ) 
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'Nhere 
8=(0 b,) 
" , 0 ' 
' lIld where (dfn = (« ,(f ). <', IO) } i, a sequence uf independen t aod 
identically distriblHcu random variables with expected value 0, 
This model of ob~crvatiou 3nd expectat ion formation \\!ould a rise, for 
exa mple, from a two-person game with linear react-ion functi ons (such as 
a lin ea r duopoly ) in which =i( t) is player i's obse rvation of his opponent's 
action at Lime t (~ay q _;(1). perhaps o bserved with noise- thus, :/ ( / ) = 
'1 . ,(f) + <,,(f». a nd in which x,(T) i< player ;" expectation about his 
opponent's IIt'XI ac tion. Let player 1'5 rt!3clio ll function be '1 1 =r {I t + b l (12 
and player Ts ql =a2 +b':.c/ t . and assume (hat each player i's act ion q.U) 
is his best respon se to his jtJrer..:mil x ,( t) abuu t what his opponelH wiIJ do 
nex I. Th f:1l wc ha vc 
(,(I») =(q,(I») + (C, (f ») 
\ , ,(1) '1,11 ) e,11) 
",)(,",(/-1'1) +("'iI»). 
u ,-, (I - I ) ,",(I) 
ami lhe Nash equ iJibrium and the rational expet.:ta tioIls equiJibrium 
..:o illdde (wc igno re boum.lary co nditio ns): 
(/ , +h{iJ _! 
1'. - '1' - -'---;-'--:-' 
-- , - , - I b,b,' ; = L 2, 
I r each player fo rms hi ~ fo recas t hy averaging his past observa tions. i.e., if 
and if we work with den'mimls from the ~qui1i bJ'ium (i.e .. (I 1 = iJ:z = 0 I. then 
Eqs. I I) 'lnd (2) uescribe the movement of expectations " "U ohscrva tions 
over lime. and wc ca n ask whelh~r the p!<iyers \\liH eventually "Iea rn" to 
have COrrect expectations x ,·· about oue another and therefore learn to tnke 
the equilibrium actions qt· . In o ther wo rdsJ if the system's i:1w uf modon 
is given by ( I ) and (2), \1,IilI it cOll v.:rgc [0 its equilibrium? 
Stoehastic difference cqualion ,),_,toms of rht form given b), (1 ) and (2) 
arc called by Ljung " rct:ursivc scochastic estimation algorilhms." His 
method for analyz.ing the asymptotic propcni!!s of these algori thms is tu 
at'oid direct analysis of tbe diflerence equation systcm, and instead to 
id..:nliry an Clssocia ted dif.Ji..~r('lIti{l1 equation. F;,lch of his rwo theorcm~ then 
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gives a sat of conditions On Ibe algorithm Q/ld its associated differential 
equation which ensure that, if the diJl'erenlial equation has an asymptotically 
stable stationary point, then the asymptotic behavior of the difference 
equation system will be the same as that of the differential equation, i.e., 
the difference equation system win converge (almost surely) to the 
dill"'ential equation'S stationary point. 
Applying Ljung's method to our system (I) and (2), we first substitute 
Z(I) from (I) into (21 to obtain as the transition function tbe following 
stocbastic difference equation: 
1 I 
x(t) =.«1- 1 )+- [(B - 1) X(I - I)] -t--e(t), 
I I 
(3) 
for which Ljung's associated differential equation (ADE) is X = f(x) = 
(8 -I)x, which ha, x' = C}-the equilibrium-as its unique stationary 
point. The stationary poin!'s domain of attraction, which we denote by ~, 
depends on the eigenvalues of the matrix 8-T. We assume that b,b, < 1 
(i.e., that the reaction curves "cross the rigbt way" for best-response 
behsvior to be stable); heDce, both cigenvalues are negative and we have 
~=R'. 
Ljung's First Theorem requires that the forecasts lie in a bounded arca 
infinitely often, i.e. , tbat we can find a bounded subsequence of {.t(I)}. This 
is usually a dillicult condition to check, even for systems as simple as ours. 
ro avoid this dillieulty, Ljung provides his Second Theorem, for which 
he modifies the forecasting algorithms (2) into the following projeclion 
.algorithm, which we denote by (2'): 
Let D be a bounded subset of R' with a nonempty interior; 
Let C be a closed subset of the interior of D, called the algorithm's 
(argel set; 
Let (p(t)l be a sequence of points' in C; 
And instead of (2), the forecast X(I) is given by 
) {_~(r) x(/ = p(t1 if x(t)ED if X(t)fD, 
Where .«I)=.«I-II+(I/ I)(Z(I) - .<(I-I»). 
(2'.) 
(2'b) 
LjUOI; and SMentrom (2] sugguI that ptl) can be taken I? be. ror instance. o'{"(t -I~. a.n~ 
'thq ci1e Ljung [1] as pro'o'iding'!t proor of convcrgt:rlcc. It li dctu'. however, Ibal lJungs 
r8ec0nd Theorem does not apply 10 such 3 projectiaD ulgorithm.: The rule p(t) = X(/ ,-l,) ~oes 
!!lOt-yield an aJgorilhm or lhr: rann (2') because il does Dot guarantee that p(t) Wlll he: \~ fI 
~ subset of the interior or D. (The diE>tancc: from tIDY ~uch elos.ed :\ubsi!t C to tbe exteno.-
~D' must be positive. and t.bertfore we might have: ;r{t - I)~ D\ C.) 
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Algorithm (2') diJfers from (2) in that the forcx:asts in (2') arc made to 
lie in a prcspecified bounded set D by substituting, for any fo= x(r) 
tbatlie. outside D, a point per) that does lie in D. (Tbere is an important 
technical reason, which we describe momentarily, why the sequence (p(r)} 
must be bounded away from the exlerior of D. ) It is naturaito interpret the 
set D as the support o[ the [orccaster's beliefs: When the forecast obtained 
ties out.side this set, the forecaster ignores it (as an "outlier"-an atypical, 
perhaps mistaken, value), and uses an alternative prediction p(l) instead. It 
is important to note, in particular. that the use of a projection algorithm 
in a model of learning behavior is a hehu"ioral assumptio/l and not simply 
an analytical device for studying convergence properties. 
Ljung's Second Theorem rcquin:s. r'lughly, that trajectories of the ADE 
thllt start in C never ).,ave th~ set D. This condition is fonnalized in terms 
of a ULyapunov-like" function U that appears in the foUowing condition. 
Condilion L. Tbe system (1) and (2') is said to satisfy Condition L if 
there is a twice cOntinuously diJfcrentiable nonnegative real valued function 
U: IR' - R. that satisfies 
(Ll) VxeD\ C : U'{x)J(x)<O, and 
(L.2) 3c"<,, wilh 0,.., <c,' such that VxeC:U(x),.c, and 
'Ix~D: U{x);;.c,. 
lsUNo's S.COND THEOREM. Let rhe ADE of a projecliQn algorirhm (sudl 
as Ihe algorirhm defint!d by (I) and (2' » be * =[(x), and let x · be an 
asympwlical/y slahle stationary point of [(i.e., Ihe domain of aUraerion flJ 
o[ x' under f is an open ser). If rh. algorithm's target sel is a sub"'1 o[ !?A, 
and if the algorilhm satisfies Condilion L. then [or any x(O) the s. quene. 
(X(I)} converges almosl surely ro x'. 
If the forecasts are dcs,ribed by a projection "Igorithm such as (2'), then 
at each time I each individual must choose x ,{r) = x,(I), or else each must 
cboose X,(I) = PI(t). Each Jljlrson must therefore know whether or not 
.i(r) e D in order to know whether he should invoke the projection 
operator and thereby revert to p ,(I). In particular, he must know the other 
person's unprojec~d forecase .<-,(1). This is clearly unsatisfactory. If our 
intent is to explain how individuals might attain equilibrium even when 
they do not start out knowing what one another will do, then wc do not 
want to assume that they know oDe anothers' forecasts. 
It is natural, then, to def1l1c a deeenrrallied projection algorithm as ODC 
in which each individual has a projection operator that be invokes 
intiept!l1denrl,., whenever hi, own for"".st tics outside a given set (say. the. 
support of his own beliefs about tbe others' equilibrium actions). In our 
example. then, we would have; for ;= t. 2. the foUowing. denoted by(r): 
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Lel D, be a bounded subsel of !i1 wilh a noncmply inlerior. 
Lel C, be a nonemply closed subsel of Ihe interior of D,. 
Let l p ,(t) l be a sequence of points in C,. 
The forecasl x,(t) i, given hy 
( {
.i';(I) 
x I) = 
, p,(t) 
if .r,(I) ~D, 
if .• ,(l)tD,. 
where .', (1) = x, (t - t ) + (1 / 1)(=,(1) - x,(t - t ) . 
(2"a) 
(2"b) 
I, Ihe algorilhm (2" ) of the form (2'), so Iha! Ljung" Second Theorem 
can be applied to if! This would require both Ihal D = D, X D, and 
c= C, xC" BUI now suppose that at some time I we baYe, say, .i:,(I)~D, 
and .• , (I)ED, . Then .i'(I!~D and the algorithm (2') requires that 
x(1! = p(l)" c. But according to (2 " ). only person I invokes the projection 
operator : x,(r) = f1,(I)eC" but X,(I) need not fie in C, . Tbus. x(t) will lie 
in the set C, x D,. but not necessarily in C, .. ' algorithm (2') requires. 
In other words. a decemralioed projection algorithm is not a projection 
algorithm of the kind to which Ljung's Second Theorem applies.' 
Could wc remove the set C from the definition of a projeclion algorithm, 
i.e .. could we allow C = D, so that the definition would include decen-
tralized projection algorithms? It seems nol. The requirement in algorithm 
(2') that each term 1'(1) lie in a given closed set C which is in turn 
contained in the interior of lJ (i.c., Ihal the , equence ( p(1 ) l be bounded 
away from the eXlerior of D) is of fundamental importance in the proof of 
Ljung's Second Theorem (sce [5, Remark I]): It guarantees tbat if the 
projection algorithm were invokL"d infinitely many times, {x(1) l would 
bave a subsequence in the (compact) sct C and would therefore have a 
limit point in the interior of D. This interior limit poinl play~ " crucial role 
in provin£ that, if Condition L is satisfied, the projection operalor could in 
fact only be invoked finilely many times, so that an algorithm of the form 
(2') wiU evcntuaUy be of the form (2'a), and will therefore behave 
·asymptotically like it' ADE. Existence of <uch an interior limit poinl is not 
guaranleed for a decentralized algorithm of the form (2 " ), and it is not 
clear how the proof of Ljung's Second Theorem could be nltered 10 include 
drxcntrali,.ed algorithms. 
There is a second difficulty in applying Ljung's Second Theorem to 
t!ccentralized forecasting problems. Suppose that , after al~ we could prove 
a version of the Secoml Theorem that would coyer decentralized projection 
II1goritbms. Now consider the impfications of Condition L. This condition 
~~arcet IlnQ Surgcnl [4] misr.a.k:enly .apply Ljun~ ' 5 Second Tlu:or~m 10 a projection 
~rator of lbt= form (2~) , Set: ltcmark I in Morcno 3nd Walket [5] [or an IIni1b:5i~ Df 1hl! 
Obilacles to aililpdnf, the th1:orcm's proor to opcrr'ltors of the: form (~ "' ), 
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D 
eJfcctively requires that tbe trajectories of tbe ADE. when starting in C, 
never leave the set D; if we choose C, very close to VI> the trajectories of 
the ADE at tbe boundary of V must point inward To sce tbe implications 
of this assumption for ou,- example. suppose tllat the sets V, and V, are 
bounded intervals in R. Figure I gives the phase diagram of the ADE. 
Tbe lines .t, = 0 and X, = 0 are the reaction functions of players I and 2, 
respectively, in the two-person game if", and b, are both negative and the 
stability condition b,b, < I is satisfied At point x, 00 the boundary of D, 
the ADE will follow a trajectory that will drive Ihe system out of the set 
V; therefore, Condition L is not satisfied here. It is only wben the upper left 
and lower right corners of D lie between the graphs of the functions .i I = 0 
aDd X 2 ~ 0, as iD Fig. 2. that Condition L is satisfied. If V, aDd V, are the 
real intervals (IX,. (i,) and (a" fl,), then Condition L requires tbat the 
following inequalities be satisfied (when b I and b, are both negative); 
and 
',=0 
F10UltE 2 
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By imposing Condition 1... then, we are e[ectively requlnng that the 
individual beliefs have supports that are not independent of one another. If 
each firm arrives at its support D, independently, Condition L will not 
generally be satisfied. 
An alternative interpretation is that ConditioD L is a kind of cO'lsistenl 
beliefs condition, similar to the consistency of prior beliefs that plays such 
an important role in justifying Nash equilibrium via common-knowledge 
arguments. But the primary reason for studying models of learning is 
10 explain the attainment of equilibrium when individuals do not bave 
full information about one another. Therefore Condition L, and Ljung's 
projection operators, do not Seem to be appropriate for modcling 
decenrrolized processes of decision making and expectation fonnation. 
It may be, however, that decentralit.ed projection operators sueh as (2") 
are in Cact good descriptions oC the way individuals Corm expectations. If so, 
il is an important question Cor further rCl;earch whether there is n deeen-
trali7.cd analogue of Ljung's Second Theorem, " tbeorem Ibal will give 
us conditions under whicb decentralized recur$i .. stocbastic estimation 
algorithms converge. 
Rl!FERENCES 
1. L. LJUNG. Anulyu1. of recursive :It()CbaMic aJgorithnllS. JIiE£ Tra1U.. Au/vmfuic CmJUoJ 
AC-llll977). m-575. 
1 L. l.JUNG AND T. SUD1::R.Ull6M, "Theory and Pntc:titt of. Rocurslve Identificatioo," MIT 
p""" Cambridge, MA. 19R3. . ' . 
3. A. MAKCET ArID T, SNtC;E;NT, Com·~rg.cnte of leasl-scrllares leunnllg mccltilm!lm!i. ID .selr· 
rcferenliallinear slochastlc models, 1. &on... Th~fJ'''' 48 (1989). 331-36&. . 
4. A . MAAa:T AND T. SA.Jlli'L'J, Convcrgena: or kast-5QUUd learning in eo.vironmenls wltb 
hidden state vtltillbll!S. and prtyatc inrortnmuoc., j. PoJit. Econ. 9'7 (l989), 13~J322.. . 
S: D. MOfU!NO ASO M. W~Lr.D... CDn\'crgence theon:rns ror a class of '('C\..,.~"'C sloc~asllc 
al,orithm,. in "'The Economics or Informational Decentralization: Complcx~ty. F..ffiClcncy. 
and SlIlbility" (J. Ledyard.. Ed.J. Ktuw~ .. Academic Publlshers. Am3Icrdam, U~ press. 
6. M. W(xmrok[), Learning 10 bdieve in ~ • .m,'iJlots. Er:Momr:!rif:a Sf! (1990). 277-307. 
8
